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ARTICLES
FEDERALISM AND DUE PROCESS:
SOME RUMINATIONS
Gardner Cromwell*
INTRODUCTION
There was a time not so long ago when the phrase "states'
rights" was anathema, calling up visions of schoolchildren being
denied adequate educational facilities, a governor standing in the
schoolhouse door, and armed police and troops keeping the public
order. Now the scene has shifted, and the phrase is uttered in dif-
ferent quarters, with calls for a "sagebrush rebellion" and protec-
tion of states' natural resources against demands for national
needs. Whether it appears in political or social contexts, the local-
national tension inheres in the structure of this country. The pen-
dulum seems now to be swinging toward the local end of the arc. A
purpose of this article is to seek whether some such similar swing
appears in constitutional adjudication. As one writer has pointed
out,' the structure of the Constitution of the United States of
America recognizes the existence of separate sovereigns-the
United States and the several states. Furthermore, the Tenth
Amendment reserves to the states those powers not specifically
delegated to the national government. And the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, by prohibiting denial of due process of law or equal protec-
tion of the laws by the several states, recognizes their power to act
in spheres uncontrolled by the United States. An additional pur-
pose of this article is to examine briefly whether a shift in judicial
interpretative modes may suggest renewed recognition of the con-
stitutional structure of federalism.
MODES OF INTERPRETATION
It used to be that fashions in constitutional interpretation
were phrased in such terms as "strict construction" and "liberal
* Professor Cromwell has been a member of the faculty of the School of Law, Univer-
sity of Montana, since 1957, having taught theretofore at New York University. He holds
the degrees B.A. and LL.B. from the University of Montana, and LL.M. and S.J.D. from the
University of Michigan.
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construction." Sometimes the opposed modes were stated as "judi-
cial self-restraint" versus "judicial activism;" Justice Frankfurter
was suggested as a model of the former, and Justice Douglas as
exemplary of the latter. Much of the time, supporters and critics
applied terminology as shorthand for evaluation of particular re-
sults. A classic statement critical of uncritical admiration of "activ-
ism" is that of Judge Learned Hand: "For myself it would be most
irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians, even if I
knew how to choose them, which I assuredly do not."2
Most recently, there have appeared multi-syllabic Latin-based
labels, which suggest a measure of subjectivity not apparent in the
earlier phrases. Today, the modes are called respectively, "inter-
pretivism" and "noninterpretivism." The former, akin to "judicial
self-restraint," contends that the judiciary is bound by standards
specifically stated or clearly implicit in the Constitution.' The lat-
ter, as suggested by the negative prefix, takes the position that the
Court ought to so interpret the Constitution as to relate it to
evolving societal values.
Consider, with regard to these positions, a statement made by
Justice Powell5 in a speech during the 1976 annual meeting of the
American Bar Association:
The present Court, mindful of preserving the vitality of demo-
cratic processes, may be more deferential to the legislative judg-
ments, it is more likely to give some weight to federalism, and it
is more conventional in demanding compliance with jurisdictional
and standing requirements."
That sounds more like "self-restraint" and "interpretivism" than
their opposites; it suggests attention to constitutional structure
and text. The discussion which follows will consider these ideas in
two rather narrow contexts chosen out of that large and complex
area called constitutional law: substantive due process and irrebut-
table presumptions.
2. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958).
3. See, e.g., Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property", 62 CORNELL L.J. 405 (1977).
4. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRusT: A THEORY OF JUDIcIAL REVIEW 88-89
(1980) [hereinafter cited as ELY]; Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN.
L. REV. 703 (1975).
5. The New York Times, Nov. 23, 1980, § 4 at E7, col. 5, reported that the title "Mr.
Justice" had been quietly dropped in favor of "Justice." It was asserted to be "an advance
effort to accommodate a woman among the ranks .. "
6. What the Justices Are Saying, 62 A.B.A.J. 1454, 1455 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Justices].
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SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Elsewhere in his speech before the American Bar Association,
Justice Powell remarked: "Few would deny that the Warren Court,
in a fifteen-year span, vastly expanded the role of the judiciary by
construing the Constitution in dramatically bold and unprece-
dented ways."'7 Certainly one of those areas was "substantive due
process." Condemned by Justice Black as applications of "natural
law" which gave vent to the subjective preferences of judges,8 the
idea that the due process clauses in the Constitution may be con-
strued to create individual rights ("substantive" law) rather than
to guarantee that procedure is "due" (fair) has been around almost
as long as the Constitution. For example, a separate opinion by
Justice Chase in Calder v. Bull,9 contained this language:
The purposes for which men enter into society will determine the
nature and terms of the social compact; and as they are the foun-
dation of legislative power, they will decide what are the proper
objectives of it .... There are certain vital principles in our free
Republican governments, which will determine and over-rule an
apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power; ... or to take
away that security for personal liberty, or private property, for
the protection whereof the government was established.1"
To which Justice Iredell replied, setting the stage. for the continu-
ing debate: "The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed
standard. .... 11
Calder v. Bull concerned an "ex post facto" attack on civil leg-
islation which the Court rejected, so the decision is not as impor-
tant to "substantive due process" as are the ideas expressed in the
opinions. Implicit, however, are the separate elements involved in
the concept. From the first, the Constitution has been recognized
as containing grants of specified powers from the people to the
United States, 2 and the Court early assumed the ultimate power
of interpretation.I Limitations on the exercise of sovereign powers
appear in the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The Court's power to interpret extends likewise to
the amendments. The result of a determination that a person pos-
sesses a "substantive due process" right is to limit the power of a
7. Id.
8. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 511 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
9. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
10. Id. at 388 (emphasis in original). See ELY, supra note 4, at 210-11 n.41.
11. Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 399.
12. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
13. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
19811 185
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state to act for what it conceives to be the general welfare. Hence,
the presence of federalism.
a. So-called "Economic Rights"
Although not the first of the cases which established substan-
tive due process rights in the economic sphere," Lochner v. New
York"5 may be the most prominent. The New York legislature had
passed legislation which made it a crime to employ a baker for
more than 60 hours in one week. Although Mr. Lochner, the em-
ployer, was convicted of having done so, and required to pay a fine,
most of the opinion considered the problem from the point of view
of the employee and his liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court recognized the police power of the state, and its capac-
ity to act for the general welfare, but stated that the conflict was
between the individual's right to make a contract for his labor and
the state's power to prevent him from contracting beyond a certain
number of hours. The individual won. The question, said the
Court, could be answered simply: "There is no reasonable ground
for interfering with the liberty of person or the right of free con-
tract, by determining the hours of labor, in the occupation of a
baker."1 The state's action was unreasonable, unnecessary, and
arbitrary.17
Although the Lochner case struck down hours-of-labor legisla-
tion for bakers, Muller v. Oregon'1 approved Oregon legislation
limiting the hours of labor of women in laundries and factories to
14. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) appears to be the first instance of the
Court holding a state law unconstitutional on the basis of substantive due process. It is also
the beginning of a series of cases which came'to be described by the Court as "the Allgeyer-
Lochner-Adair-Coppage constitutional doctrine."
15. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
16. Id. at 57.
17. A result of this approach was the refusal of a majority of the Court to recognize a
state power to affect the unequal bargaining power of employers and employees. Coppage v.
Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915), held unconstitutional a law designed to protect labor organizing
activities on the ground that the police power could not be used to affect inequalities which
resulted from exercising contract and property rights. The Coppage decision relied on Adair
v. U.S., 208 U.S. 161 (1908), a Fifth Amendment due process case invalidating a federal law
which prohibited interstate railroads from requiring employees not to join unions. The opin-
ion spoke of the equal rights of employer and employee to contract.
18. 208 U.S. 412 (1908). The sex-based distinction approved in 1908 is in marked con-
trast to the treatment of the same subject today. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677 (1973). But the problem of "interpretivism" versus "noninterpretivism" persists in a
new context-equal protection of the laws rather than due process of law. It has been recog-
nized that some modern equal protection analytical methods do not differ from those em-
ployed in "substantive due process." See, e.g., Karst, Invidious Discrimination and the Re-
turn to the Natural-Law-Due-Process Formula, 16 UCLA L. Rv. 716 (1969).
[Vol. 42
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ten hours per day. The basis for the Court's conclusion was recog-
nition of the differences between males and females, justifying
"protection" of women which would not pass constitutional muster
for men. The Court asserted that the liberty of contract which it
had found to be a substantive right growing out of the due process
clause "is not absolute and extending to all contracts. . . .,19
Cases in the 1930's, such as Nebbia v. New York,20 or West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,2 1 suggested an easing by the Court in
its examination of the power of states in economic legislation. By
1955, the Supreme Court was prepared to reject out-of-hand a due
process attack on state regulation of business activity. Williamson
v. Lee Optical Co. 22 concerned Oklahoma legislation which prohib-
ited the fitting of eyeglass lenses or the duplicating of such lenses
by others than licensed opthalmologists or optometrists or on their
prescriptions. The Court took a very deferential approach to the
state's action, recognizing that it was the province of the state leg-
islature to determine rationally how to correct what it saw to be a
police power problem. The opinion of the Court, delivered by Jus-
tice Douglas, contained this language: "The day is gone when this
Court uses the Due Process of the Fourteenth Amendment to
strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial condi-
tions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony
with a particular school of thought."23 The day, in truth, was gone
for "business and industrial conditions," but for other interests it
dawned again hardly a decade later.
b. So-called "Noneconomic Rights"
It is important to recall that the words in both due process
clauses are "life, liberty, or property." There is nothing in those
words to suggest that the "liberty" of the person which is pro-
tected against deprivation without due process of law is somehow
divided between "economic" interests and all others. Consider
Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.,2 4 a procedural due process
case which concerned an attack on a state statute that permitted
garnishment without a judicial hearing. The precise question
before the Court was whether United States District Courts had
19. Muller, 208 U.S. at 421.
20. 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (upholding a minimum-sale-price-of-milk regulation).
21. 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (affirming a state's power to fix minimum wage rates for
females).
22. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
23. Id. at 488 (citing, inter alia, the Nebbia and Parrish cases).
24. 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
1981]
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jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), concerning deprivation of
"rights . ..secured by the Constitution. . . ." The district court
did not reach the merits, construing the word "rights" to mean
only "personal" as opposed to "property" rights. 5 The opinion of
the Court rejected that distinction, adding this language:
[T]he dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is
a false one. Property does not have rights. People have rights.
The right to enjoy property without unlawful deprivation, no less
than the right to speak or the right to travel, is in truth a "per-
sonal" right, whether the "property" in question be a welfare
check, a home, or a savings account .... 1
Be that as it may, the dichotomy has been practiced. It may
be that it has always been there. United States v. Carolene Prod-
ucts Co." illustrated the deferential Court review of state rlegula-
tion in the economic sphere, justifying that approach partly on the
basis of a presumption that the legislative branch has acted consti-
tutionally. What has since become famous as "footnote 4''28 sug-
gested that the Court's application of the presumption might be
less broad when legislation appeared on its face to run afoul of
some "specific" prohibition. Among such were listed the First
Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and religion. And the
footnote cited as precedent, among others, the case of Meyer v.
Nebraska.2 9
In Meyer, the Court faced the question whether a state could
prohibit teaching in any language other than English. The Ne-
braska statute was an outgrowth of experiences in World War I; a
teacher was convicted of violating the statute by teaching German.
The Court defined the "liberty" protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment as including "not merely freedom from bodily re-
straint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in
any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up chil-
dren. . .. "0 The statute was found to unconstitutionally interfere
with three different liberties: the jobs of teachers of modern lan-
guages, the acquisition of knowledge by children in schools, and
the freedom of parents to determine how their children should be
25. Id. at 542.
26. Id. at 552.
27. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
28. Id. at 152.
29. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
30. Id. at 399. The Court cited a number of cases in support, among them Allgeyer
and Lochner.
[Vol. 42
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educated." In two other instances, in the first half of the twentieth
century, the Court found substantive rights created by the word
"liberty." Pierce v. Society of Sisters3 2 invalidated an Oregon stat-
ute which required that all children attend public schools. The
Court followed the lead of the Meyer decision in holding that the
statute interfered with the freedom of parents to direct the educa-
tion of their children. In 1942, the Court decided Skinner v.
Oklahoma," invalidating a statute which required sterilization of
persons convicted three times of a certain category of crime. The
Court included the ability to procreate as a part of Fourteenth
Amendment "liberty."
A short ten years after the Lee Optical Co. case3 ' had upheld
the power of a state to limit the fitting of eyeglasses to certain call-
ings in the face of a "substantive due process" attack, the Court
denied states the power to prohibit the use of contraceptive de-
vices. Griswold v. Connecticut" gave constitutional recognition to
a "right of privacy" which apparently had been created in a Law
Review article written three-quarters of a century earlier. 6 At the
very beginning of the opinion of the Court, Justice Douglas, who
had written for the Court in Lee Optical Co.,3 7 rejected that ap-
proach as the basis for decision. "We do not," he wrote, "sit as a
super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of
laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social con-
dition."" The issue was regarded as involving a personal interest
and, therefore, somehow different. But the problem was that the
Constitution does not explicitly mention anything like a "right of
privacy." There are six opinions; the opinion of the Court well il-
lustrates the "noninterpretivist" mode.
The Court stated that it was following the principle estab-
lished by the Pierces' and Meyer'0 cases. It stated, furthermore,
that the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights "have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them
life and- substance."" The First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth
Amendments and their emanations, taken together, create zones of
31. Id. at 401.
32. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
33. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
34. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
35. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
36. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890).
37. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
38. 381 U.S. at 482 (emphasis added).
39. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
40. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
41. 381 U.S. at 484.
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privacy." Therefore, the state may not, by regulation, invade this
area of protected freedom. It is not clear from the opinion (or the
other five) what particular bases exist for the right of privacy; what
is clear is that the limitation on state action is contained in the
language of the Fourteenth Amendment. Since no equal protection
issue was raised, the limitation must be found in the words "due
process." And since the case did not raise questions about "life" or
"property," that process of elimination leaves "liberty." The Gris-
wold case, then, is "substantive due process" in an area other than
business or economics. The consequence is that a state has power
to act to protect the general welfare by prohibiting one from fitting
eyeglasses without "proper" training, but it lacks power to tell one
that he cannot use contraceptives.
Roe v. Wade,' the so-called abortion decision, is at the root of
another present social conflict-that between the "pro-life" and
"pro-choice" forces. It is significant for the purposes of this article,
however, for what it asserts about the basis for the right of privacy.
The United States District Court, following the lead of the concur-
ring opinion of Justice Goldberg in the Griswold case," based its
conclusion on the Ninth Amendment, but the opinion of the Court,
delivered by Justice Blackmun, felt it to "be founded in the 14th
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon
state action. . .. -"4 Professor John Hart Ely calls Roe v. Wade
"the clearest example of noninterpretivist 'reasoning' on the part
of the Court in four decades. .. .
If that is so, it is appropriate to seek now whether Justice
Powell's 1976 remarks' 7 about giving more deference to legislatures
and recognition to the principles of federalism are mirrored in
"substantive due process" decisions. It is difficult to say, but there
may be some evidence in a few cases which emphasizes family rela-
tions. The uncertainty results partly from a mixing of due process
and equal protection analysis and partly from the manner in which
a majority of the Court may characterize the state's activity. Illus-
trative is Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,'48 a case concerning the
local sovereign's capacity to zone real property and objection
thereto based upon assertion of violation of personal liberties. The
village had restricted use of a portion of the land to one-family
42. Id.
43. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
44. 381 U.S. at 486.
45. 410 U.S. at 153 (emphasis added).
46. ELY, supra note 4, at 2.
47. Justices, supra note 6.
48. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
[Vol. 42
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dwellings, and defined "family," in part, as meaning no more than
two persons unrelated by blood, adoption or marriage." Six unre-
lated persons occupying a one-family dwelling challenged the re-
striction on grounds that it interfered with their constitutional
rights, among others, to travel, to migrate, and to privacy. 0 The
opinion of the Court rejected all attacks, treating the village ordi-
nance as raising an equal protection rather than due process ques-
tion, and concluded that the subject was economic and social legis-
lation. 1 The Court held the ordinance to be a proper exercise of
the police power, "ample to lay out zones where family values,
youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air
make the area a sanctuary for people." 2
That quotation, supporting the sovereign's use of the police
power in aid of the general welfare, appeared in Moore v. East
Cleveland," but in a dissenting opinion." The case concerned an
ordinance containing a complicated definition of "family." 8 For
present purposes, it is sufficient to state that the definition re-
quired that all residents of the household be related, but the kinds
of relations and numbers of individuals were limited. Mrs. Moore
lived in her home with her son, his son, and another of her grand-
sons, a cousin of the latter, and was convicted of a violation of the
ordinance because the cousin was an "illegal occupant." The plu-
rality opinion by Justice Powell, joined by three other members of
the Court, took the position that the ordinance offended the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the
equal protection clause. Citing Meyer, Pierce, Griswold, and Roe,
among others, the opinion asserted that what they were protecting
were family values. "Our decisions establish that the Constitution
protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution
of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition.""
The addition of the element of "tradition" suggests a less
49. Id. at 2.
50. Id. at 7.
51. Id. at 8.
52. Id. at 9. Justice Marshall's dissent, id. at 12, argued that the ordinance constituted
an unconstitutional burden on the right to privacy of the six persons. His opinion relied on,
among others, cases discussed heretofore, Meyers, Griswold, and Roe.
53. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
54. Id. at 531, 539.
55. Id. at 496 n.2.
56. Id. at 503. Justice Stevens concurred in-the judgment on a different substantive
due process ground. He argued that the ordinance unconstitutionally limited "a fundamen-
tal right normally associated with the ownership of property-that of an owner to decide
who may reside on his or her property .. " Id. at 520.
1981]
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"noninterpretivist" approach than that which marked the prevail-
ing opinion in Roe v. Wade. The plurality opinion differentiated
the Belle Terre case on the ground, among others, that that ordi-
nance affected individuals who were not related, and emphasized
that the East Cleveland ordinance sliced "deeply into the family
itself. ' 57 If one views the modern "substantive due process" cases
as limiting an expansive reading of "privacy" to that concerned
with "family" matters and, in turn, defining such matters by ad-
verting to "tradition," the result may be said to accord with Jus-
tice Powell's speech."
The presence of "family" interests figures in another branch of
due process analysis, that concerning so-called irrebuttable pre-
sumptions, to which attention now turns.
IRREBUTTABLE PRESUMPTIONS
In December, 1976, Jacqueline Jarrett was granted a divorce
from Walter Jarrett, and custody of their three daughters, aged 12,
10, and 7 years. He was granted reasonable visitation rights. In
April, 1977, five months later, she told Walter that her boyfriend
was going to move in with her and their daughters. Walter objected
to no avail. He then petitioned the trial court to modify the di-
vorce decree and grant him custody of his daughters on the ground
that he did not want them raised in an immoral atmosphere. At
the hearing, Jacqueline admitted that she and her boyfriend had
no plans to marry; Walter testified that, in his opinion, the ar-
rangement was not a proper moral atmosphere in which to raise
three girls. The trial court modified the original decree to award
custody to Walter, finding that it was "necessary for the moral and
spiritual well-being and development" 9 of the daughters. The Illi-
nois Appellate Court reversed on the basis that the trial court had
not found Jacqueline unfit and that the trial record did not show
any negative effects on the daughters.60
The Supreme Court of Illinois granted leave to appeal and, by
a divided vote, reversed the appellate court, affirming the trial
court judgment. The majority relied on Illinois's fornication stat-
57. Id. at 498. Justice Stewart's dissent rejected the distinction based on family. Id. at
535. Justice White's dissent did not so view the plurality analysis. He argued that applying
the test of "traditions" to find an interest to be protected by substantive due process "would
broaden enormously the horizons of the Clause. Id. at 549-50.
58. Justices, supra note 6.
59. Jarrett v. Jarrett, 78 Ill.2d 337, 342, 400 N.E.2d 421, 422 (1979).
60. Id. The appellate court opinion appears at 64 Il. App. 3d 932, 937, 382 N.E.2d 12,
16 (1978).
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utes' as setting the moral standard of the state and concluded that
"her conduct offends prevailing public policy. '" 2 That, said the
court, amounted to instructing her daughters by example, a finding
supporting the trial court's conclusion. Only in passing did the
majority refer to "irrebuttable presumptions." With reference to
Stanley v. Illinois,3 it differentiated this case on the ground that
the trial court did not indulge a presumption but made a finding
on the evidence before it." One dissenting opinion asserted that
the majority had applied a "conclusive presumption""5 by relying
on the fornication statute without any showing of Jacqueline's un-
fitness. Furthermore, asserted that opinion, the only difference be-
tween this case and Stanley was that between a statutory pre-
sumption and one judicially created.6
On October 20, 1980, the Supreme Court of the United States
denied a petition for a writ of certiorari in Jarrett v. Jarrett.7 And
there the story might have ended but for the dissenting opinion of
Justices Brennan and Marshall." The decision of the Illinois Su-
preme Court, in their view, appeared "to contravene the teaching
of Stanley v. Illinois"" because "there is no rational basis for the
conclusive presumption actually utilized, whether Jacqueline is
viewed as having violated the fornication statute only or as being a
lawbreaker generally. '7 0 The opinion pointed out that there was no
evidence of harm to the children. So, they wrote, "this case
squarely presents the question whether the Due Process Clause en-
titled Jacqueline to a meaningful hearing at which the trial judge
determines, without use of a conclusive presumption, whether vio-
lation of the fornication statute adversely affects the well-being of
the children."7
61. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-8 (1977).
62. Jarrett, 78 Ill. 2d at 346, 400 N.E.2d at 424.
63. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
64. Jarrett, 78 Ill. 2d at 350, 400 N.E.2d at 426.
65. Id. at-352,-400 N.E.2d at 427.
66. Id. at 353, 400 N.E.2d at 427. In an article appearing in the January 1981 issue of
Trial magazine counsel for Jacqueline argued that the Illinois Supreme Court did not follow
the Stanley decision. He asserted that the Illinois court "changed the focus in the child
custody proceeding from the traditional concern for the welfare and best interests of the
child to a focus on the conduct of a custodial parent." TRIAL, Jan. 1981, at 58. He expressed
concern for the potential consequences of that decision on the lives of "one million children
per year involved in the dissolution of their families." Id.
67. - U.S. -, 101 S.Ct. 329 (1980).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 330.
70. Id. at 330-31.
71. Id. at 331. The dissenters pointed out in a footnote that the state had not enforced
the fornication statute against the mother.
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Stanley v. Illinois,2 relied on by the dissents in both supreme
courts, was decided in 1972. Mr. Stanley was the unwed father of
three children who lived with them and their mother for 18 years.
When the mother died, the children were declared wards of the
state because, under Illinois law73 an unwed father was not a "par-
ent." For that reason, his children could be taken from him with-
out a showing of unfitness otherwise required.7 Mr. Stanley ap-
pealed, contending that he had been denied the equal protection of
the laws, but the Supreme Court of Illinois held that proof of his
not having been married to the mother was sufficient basis to take
his children from him.7 5
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari on
the basis of the equal protection claim, but posed the question
presented in due process terms: "Is a presumption that distin-
guishes and burdens all unwed fathers constitutionally repug-
nant?17 6 The Court answered in the affirmative: "[Als a matter of
due process of law, Stanley was entitled to a hearing on his fitness
as a parent before his children were taken from him. . . . "7 That
denial, continued the Court, while a hearing was granted to all
other "parents," denied him the equal protection of the laws. The
Court based its decision on the due process clauses yet that issue
was not raised or decided in the state courts. In a curious foot-
note" the majority stated that such a procedure was not contradic-
tory to its usual practice because, in this case, the Court "reached
the result by a method of analysis readily available to the state
court." 80
What is this thing called "irrebuttable presumption?" The
most careful, modern definition appears in Vlandis v. Kline,81 but
the idea goes farther back than that. In the Vlandis case, the
Court contended that "permanent irrebuttable presumptions have
long been disfavored under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
72. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
73.. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-14 (1977).
74. 405 U.S. at 650.
75. Id. at 646-47. The Illinois Supreme Court's decision appears at 45 Ill. 2d 132, 256
N.E.2d 814 (1970).
76. Id. at 649.
77. Id.
78. Justice Douglas did not join in the equal protection part of the opinion. Id. at 659.
79. Id. at 658 n.10.
80. A vigorous dissent took exception to the analytical mode suggested by the foot-
note, and urged that the due process issue should not have been considered by the Court
because "no due process issue was decided by any state court." Id. at 659.
81. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
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and Fourteenth Amendment." 82 Vlandis concerned a Connecticut
statute which provided that the resident status of an applicant for
admission to the state university system was to be determined by
his or her legal address at the time of application, and that that
status should remain during the entire period of attendance. In an
action by two students whose legal addresses were outside of the
state when they applied, the Court held the Connecticut effort in-
valid as a denial of due process. The majority opinion contained
this definition: "when the presumption is not necessarily true in
fact . .. [the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires] that the State allow . ..an individual to present evi-
dence . . . ."-
The Vlandis rule was followed and applied in U.S. Dept. of
Agriculture v. Murry," concerning distribution of food stamps,
and in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,85 holding uncon-
stitutional mandatory maternity leave regulations for pregnant
public school teachers. The LaFleur case was marked by the pres-
ence of a substantive due process issue, marriage and family life,
and the decision whether to bear a child. Therefore, said the
Court, the maternity leave rules "must not needlessly, arbitrarily,
or capriciously impinge upon this vital area of a teacher's constitu-
tional liberty."' The Court held that requiring a pregnant teacher
to take leave at a certain date in her pregnancy bore "no rational
relationship to the valid state interest of preserving continuity of
instruction."'
If the "irrebuttable presumption" doctrine is a part of proce-
dural due process, the only question should be whether the sover-
eign's action fails to provide a fair hearing before depriving any
person of life, liberty, or property." It should make no difference,
in application of the doctrine, whether the alleged deprivation has
to do with food stamps or a decision whether to have a baby. But,
in the view of a majority of the Court, apparently it does. Wein-
82. Id. at 446 (citing several cases dating back to 1926).
83. Id. at 452.
84. 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
85. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
86. Id. at 640.
87. Id. at 643.
88. If, on the other hand, the doctrine is really an equal protection question in mas-
querade, it asks the wrong question. From Vlandis v. Kline onward, there appeared a dis-
senting thread which urged that these cases offered only questions of classifications by the
sovereign, and that, therefore, the Equal Protection Clause was the measure. In addition, as
the dissent of Chief Justice Burger pointed out in the Vlandis case, the majority opinion
moved the "strict scrutiny" of equal protection cases into the area of procedural due pro-
cess. Vlandis, 412 U.S. at 460.
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berger v. Salfi5 9 concerned a statute which denied Social Security
survivors' benefits to widows and stepchildren whose relationship
to the deceased had begun less than nine months before his
death.90 The United States District Court had held the statute un-
constitutional as constituting an irrebuttable presumption." The
Supreme Court reversed, characterizing the statute as "social wel-
fare legislation,' 2 and differentiating the earlier decisions as in-
volving interests having a "constitutionally protected status."'9
The Court analogized this situation to that in Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co.,9" asserting that the legislature ought to have as much
leeway in making judgments about the public treasury as about
"the private sector of the economy. '
The "irrebuttable presumption" doctrine was not put to rest
there, as might have been supposed, but surfaced again in Elkins
v. Moreno.6 The question posed was whether a state had power to
refuse to grant "in-state" tuition fee status to nonimmigrant alien
residents. The United States District Court held against the state
on the basis of Vlandis v. Kline; the Court of Appeals affirmed.' 7
The Supreme Court did not resolve the dispute, however, because
of the majority's conclusion that the question whether certain
aliens could become residents of the state was "purely a matter of
state law,"' 8 which must be decided on certification to the state
court. The Court thereby avoided the question of whether to over-
rule or limit the "irrebuttable presumption" rule of the Vlandis
case, relying on its "longstanding policy." 99
There the doctrine rested, uneasily, until Jarrett v. Jarrett.00
What may be said about it now? Counsel for the wife argued that
the result in the state court (which stands as the law of the case)
would affect the lives of many children yet to be marked by their
parents' divorce.10 1 The majority of the state high court concerned
itself with what it saw as setting an example not good for the chil-
89. 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
90. Id. at 754 n.2.
91. Id. at 768.
92. Id. at 770.
93. Id. at 772.
94. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
95. 422 U.S. at 774. Justice Brennan's dissent argued that the merits of the case could
be disposed of "very briefly." In his view, the case was controlled by Vlandis. Id. at 802.
96. 435 U.S. 647 (1978).
97. Id. at 650.
98. Id. at 668.
99. Id. at 661.
100. - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 329 (1980).
101. See note 66 supra.
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drens' welfare. 102 The opinion dissenting from the denial of the pe-
tition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court saw no evidence
of harm to the children.103 While there is no knowing the basis for
that denial, the record of precedent to date suggests this: Legisla-
tive judgments will withstand "irrebuttable presumption" attack if
the legislation may be characterized as "social welfare." Such judg-
ments, even in the area of "privacy" or family matters, may with-
stand attack if they do not affect tradition. Furthermore, the re-
cord of precedent shows that what began as a broad prohibition of
legislative action which contained a "presumption. . . not necessa-
rily true in fact" has been narrowed. Finally, if the two Illinois
cases (Stanley and Jarrett) are compared, it may be argued that, if
the sovereign provides a hearing, the application therein of such a
presumption does not deny due process.
CONCLUSION
The constitutional elements suggested in Justice Powell's re-
marks were the separation of powers ("legislative judgments") and
federalism. Implicit was a suggestion that the Supreme Court, as
presently constituted, would practice "interpretivism." As that
mode is practiced in those parts of due process considered here,
the result is deference to the capacity of states to act for the gen-
eral welfare, at once, as Justice Powell intimated, restricting the
role of the judiciary and giving more weight to federalism. Five
members of the Court, as presently constituted, are over 70 years
of age.10 4 That fact, combined with the developments traced in this
article, will make Court-watching during the next four years more
than an academic exercise.
102. See text at note 62 supra.
103. See text at notes 70, 71 supra.
104. The Reagan Presidency, How Will Lawyers Fare?, 67 A.B.A.J. 21, 23 (1981). The
article asks, "What will Ronald Reagan's impact be on the composition of the Supreme
Court?"
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